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I . Introduction
One might ask: what do Calvin Coolidge, Ronald Rea-
gan, Scott Walker and Chris Christie have in common? 
The most obvious answer is that they all are (or were) 
Republican Governors, but these four men have some-
thing much deeper in common. All four have faced-off 
against powerful public sector labor unions and won. 
This paper will address and examine the similarities 
between the anti-union actions taken by these men—
Coolidge and the Boston Police Strike of 1919, Reagan 
and the Professional Air Traffic Controllers (“PATCO”) 
Strike of 1981, and Walker and Christie’s recent dealings 
with public employee unions. In the end, the reader will 
view the work of these political figures as an inspira-
tional passing of the torch between political eras. This 
paper will also briefly look ahead and discuss where this 
new wave of government-union interaction might lead 
public sector labor relations in the future.
II . Calvin Coolidge and Ronald Reagan
a. Governor Coolidge and the Boston Police 
Strike of 1919
No man’s house, no man’s wife, no man’s children 
will be safe if the police force is unionized and made 
subject to the orders of Red Unionite bosses… 
— The Los Angeles Times in response to the 1919 
Boston Police Strike.1 
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1919 was a year of extreme labor unrest. 
Between 1915 and 1921, the total number of 
public workers in unions nearly doubled, rising 
in numbers from 4.8% to 7.2%.2  This was “an 
especially impressive increase given that the total 
number of government employees in these years 
grew by more than one-quarter, from [1.8 million 
to 2.4 million.]”3 Not only were their numbers 
increasing, but also, these unions’ demands were 
becoming more extreme. “From 1916 to 1922 . . 
. demands became too heady for the [American 
Federation of Labor (“AFL”)] . . . to contain . . 
. and too menacing for business and the state 
to tolerate.”4 By that year’s end, an astound-
ing one-fifth of the United States workforce had 
been on strike.5 In February of that year, media 
headlines heralded “a ‘prelude to revolution’ 
when a general strike in Seattle closed all busi-
ness February 6 to 11th.”6 In addition to slowing 
commerce, the menace of public safety strikes 
by police and fire departments, strikes that took 
on militant characteristics, caused great civil 
turmoil.7 On May Day (the Socialist/Bolshevik 
worker’s holiday), 1919, forty mail bombs were 
sent to public leaders across the country.8
Meanwhile, in Massachusetts, where future-
President Calvin Coolidge was the Republican 
Governor, members of the Boston Police Depart-
ment, seeking a pay increase, approached the 
AFL to aid in its unionization.9 The timing of 
this request was especially inopportune for gov-
ernment leaders, coming just one year after the 
Boston Firefighters Union achieved a pay raise 
only after “threatening to resign en masse.”10 In 
May, the department was granted a charter by 
the AFL.11 In response, Police Commissioner 
Curtis issued General Order 110, barring police 
officers from “belonging to almost any organiza-
tion with ties outside the police department.”12 
Furthermore, the Commissioner suspended 
eight leading union organizers. The Mayor of 
Boston responded by organizing a commis-
sion to study the prospect of unionizing.13 The 
commission came to the conclusion that “[t]he 
majority need for public safety outweighed the 
officers’ asserted right to collective bargaining.”14 
On September 9, as a result of the City’s 
lack of cooperation and refusal to agree to the 
union’s salary demands, the police union voted 
to strike. Strike action was approved by a whop-
ping margin of 1,134 to 2, leading 1,100 officers 
to abandon their posts, leaving only 400 officers 
on active duty.15 As word of the strike spread 
throughout the city, a crowd gathered in Scollay 
Square, swelling to more than 10,000 people by 
8pm.16 Rioting, violence, and looting ensued, 
and the next morning Coolidge ordered in the 
National Guard to restore order.17 By the end of 
the conflict, five people had died.18
After the dust settled, the police union re-
quested that the striking officers be reinstated. 
Coolidge refused.19 Thanks to a high rate of 
unemployment, the Commissioner was able 
to hire an entirely new police force.20 Coolidge 
took his anti-union message across the country, 
labeling the terminated officers as “deserters.”21 
In a telegram to labor leader Samuel Gompers, 
Governor Coolidge wrote the immortal words, 
“[t]here is no right to strike against the public 
safety by anybody, anywhere, any time.”22 For 
public employee unions, the Boston police strike 
was “the most searing and enduring image of 
their history in the first half of the twentieth 
century and beyond…”23
b. President Reagan and PATCO
Coolidge’s heavy-handed style of labor manage-
ment largely disappeared as a result of the mar-
ket crash of 1929.24 The half-century between 
1930 and 1980 was largely dominated by private 
and public sector organized labor, which, gener-
ally, grew in power and numbers. Throughout 
the 1930s and 40s, private sector labor unions 
expanded their size and influence as a result of 
the Roosevelt Administration’s pro-union legisla-
tive agenda.25 During the 1950s, the American 
workforce went on strike an average of 350 
times per year.26 In 1959, Wisconsin passed the 
first state statute permitting public sector collec-
tive bargaining.27 In 1962, President Kennedy 
granted federal government employees the right 
to collectively bargain by issuing Executive Or-
der 10988.28 During the Johnson Administration, 
the size of the federal government ballooned 
due to the massive government undertakings in 
Vietnam and to fight the War on Poverty.29 As 
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the government grew, public sector unions fol-
lowed suit, expanding to numbers never before 
seen.30 “In 1955 public sector unions had a total 
of about 400,000 members; by the 1970s the total 
was more than 4,000,000.”31 
However, the tide turned during Ronald Rea-
gan’s administration. Although Reagan had an 
intermittent role as a labor leader as president of 
the Screen Actor’s Guild between 1947 and 1959, 
as President of the United States, his policies and 
rhetoric were markedly anti-union. Alan Draper, 
Professor of Government at St. Lawrence Uni-
versity, has observed that “[t]he Reagan years 
accentuated and exaggerated a trend of [labor 
union] decline.”32 When PATCO, a public sector 
labor union, tested the new president’s resolve 
less than a year into his first term, Reagan re-
sponded with steely determination.
The PATCO conflict was the culmination of 
decades of tension between PATCO and the 
Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”).33 From 
1968 to 1978, PATCO organized six slowdowns 
(ordering workers to intentionally slow the pace 
of work) and sickouts (organizing workers to 
simultaneously take unwarranted “sick” days) 
to pressure the FAA to yield to its demands.34 
Adding gasoline to an already smoldering fire, 
Reagan chose J. Lynn Helms, “a hard-charging 
fighter pilot” with a confrontational style, as 
his FAA chief in 1981.35 Helms’ counterpart at 
PATCO, Robert Poli, took control of the union 
in 1980 “with clear intentions to strike, not just 
for additional benefits, but for a revolution36 in 
the aviation community.”37 These hardnosed 
opponents set the perfect stage for a head-on 
collision in 1981.
The first round of negotiations between PAT-
CO and the Federal Government took place in 
late spring of 1981. From the start, PATCO had 
no intention of bargaining in good faith.38 At one 
of the first negotiation sessions, PATCO articu-
lated its pay demands. The federal negotiators 
replied that pay increases were nonnegotiable 
(as they had historically been) to which PATCO 
negotiators responded, “[w]e’ll work it out on the 
picket line.”39 Brian Flores, the neutral federal 
mediator, stated that “he had never seen another 
federal union make such a statement.”40 Soon 
after, PATCO met for its annual convention 
where Poli announced that “the union would 
stage a nationwide shutting down of air traffic 
from Key West to Anchorage, Puerto Rico to 
Guam, if it did not get an acceptable contract,” 
vowing, “‘the skies will be silent.’”41
While PATCO was spreading provocative 
rhetoric, the Reagan administration crafted a 
generous proposal that included following: 
an unprecedented 5 percent addition to 
base salaries[;] an exemption for control-
lers from federal caps on premium and 
overtime pay; an increase in night shift 
differential from 10 percent to 20 percent 
of salary; a guaranteed paid one-half-hour 
lunch period; a stipulation that controllers 
in high density facilities would no longer 
spend more than 6.5 hours per day on po-
sition; and severance pay that would give 
any controller medically disqualified after at 
least five years on the job a one-year salary 
in lump sum payment.42 
“Never before had the government offered so 
much in a negotiation with a federal employees’ 
union.”43 Nonetheless, when Poli was presented 
with the record offer, he was unimpressed.44 On 
June 21, 1981, as talks continued in the nation’s 
capitol, air traffic controllers flocked to their local 
strike offices for a “horse count.”45 Meanwhile, 
back in Washington, Poli bought time while 
waiting for a call from his lieutenants confirm-
ing whether or not the horse counts reached the 
required 80% approval to implement the strike.46 
At 3:30 a.m. on June 22nd (the proposed strike 
day) Poli received a call delivering the news that 
the union failed to win enough support, falling 
5% short of the number required for strike ac-
tion.47 The results shocked the PATCO leader-
ship.48 The PATCO leaders became deflated, the 
government negotiators stiffened their resolve, 
and by 10:30 a.m., the originally proposed agree-
ment was signed.49
The conflict, however, was not at an end. 
Poli and PATCO leaders were lambasted by 
controllers who thought the contract was an 
utter defeat.50 On July 1, the PATCO Executive 
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Committee met in Chicago, voting  8-0 to reject 
the contract.51 
After the vote, both sides prepared for the 
coming war. PATCO instructed its members 
to line up part-time work, eliminate debt, and 
stock up on provisions.52 For its part, the Reagan 
administration crafted an intricate strike plan, 
relying on “flow control” (limiting of flights in 
the air at one time) and recruiting replacement 
workers.53 With the illegality of the strike undis-
puted, Reagan caucused with his top advisors 
as to how to proceed. Some elements of his 
administration, including Attorney General Bill 
Smith, favored the zero-tolerance approach of 
immediately terminating the controllers.54 Rea-
gan took a more moderate approach, deciding 
on a 48-hour ultimatum for controllers to return 
to work.55 The President made clear that if the 
controllers did not return to work by the end of 
the deadline, they would be dismissed.56
After only 48-hours of additional bargain-
ing, the negotiations broke down.57 While it is 
doubtful that PATCO actually reached its 80% 
threshold in this second vote, the union leader-
ship determined that it had gone too far to back 
down at this point, and the strike was on.58 
At a national press conference in the Rose 
Garden on August 3, 1981, President Reagan 
“declared his intentions to invoke the as-of-yet 
unenforced federal statute against public sector 
strikes, and warned that those who ‘do not re-
port for work within 48 hours . . . have forfeited 
their jobs and will be terminated.’”59 Forty-Eight 
hours later, all controllers who did not return to 
work were discharged and banned from FAA 
service for life. 
c. Coolidge as Inspiration for Reagan 
It is said that Ronald Reagan launched the re-
birth of the “Coolidge Cult.”60 In every facet of 
his political life, Reagan was a proud disciple of 
Calvin Coolidge; so much so that the day he was 
inaugurated, Reagan advised the White House 
curator to remove the portrait of President Harry 
S. Truman from the Cabinet Room and replace it 
with one of President Coolidge.61 A July 4, 1981 
New York Times op-ed entitled “Calvin Reagan” 
claimed that Coolidge was Reagan’s “political 
patron saint.”62 Like Coolidge, Reagan believed 
in small government, cutting taxes and deregula-
tion. Moreover, as with Coolidge, Reagan was 
pro-business and opposed to commercial regula-
tion.63 During a 1981 interview, Reagan fawned 
over the legacy of Coolidge, saying: 
I don’t know if this country has ever had 
a higher level of prosperity as it did under 
Coolidge. And he actually reduced the 
national debt, he cut taxes several times 
across the board. And maybe the criticism 
was . . . [he wasn’t] activist enough. Well, 
maybe there’s a lesson in that.64
It is little surprise that a man who idolized Cal-
vin Coolidge as Reagan did adopted so much of 
Coolidge’s rhetoric and policy stances, including 
those dealing with public sector labor unions.  The 
similarities between their approaches led author 
John C. Armor to ponder “[w]ould the air traffic 
controllers . . . fear the no [federal public sector 
employee] strike law if an ideological child of 
Franklin Roosevelt were in the White House [in 
1981], rather than a child of Calvin Coolidge?”65
The similarities between the two men are 
striking. First, they both reached the pinnacle 
of their power during dramatically similar times 
in terms of labor relations. Much like 1919, the 
1960s and 70s saw a period of “militancy” in 
public sector unions.66 “[T]eachers, sanitation 
workers, and even police and firefighters, among 
others, engaged in job actions and (often illegal) 
strikes.”67 During the 1970s, there was an average 
of 289 major work stoppages involving 1,000 or 
more workers occurring in the U.S. each year.68 
In New York State alone, where strikes by teach-
ers are illegal, teachers went on strike an average 
of 20 times each year.69 By 1980 “the portion of 
full-time unionized public employees jumped . . 
. to 36% of the public-sector work force.”70 May 
Day in 1919 saw unprecedented confrontational 
labor activity; similarly, in the spring of 1981, the 
AFL-CIO Executive Council planned a massive 
march on Washington to protest President Rea-
gan’s labor agenda.71 It was this period, leading 




Reagan and Coolidge shared the belief that 
public sector union strikes are illegal and intoler-
able. Seeing the strong parallels between the two 
presidents, on the eve of the PATCO strike, The 
Wall Street Journal published a flattering tribute to 
Coolidge’s stout and unwavering action during 
the Boston Police Strike.74 Reagan was steadfast 
in his belief in the strike’s unlawfulness saying, 
“[d]ammit, the law is the law and the law says 
they cannot strike…”75 While walking to the 
Rose Garden the Monday morning he gave the 
controllers the ultimatum to return to work, Rea-
gan contemplated quoting Coolidge’s telegram 
to Gompers. 76 Although he refrained from using 
Coolidge’s exact words, Coolidge’s spirit was 
clearly present. Media personnel present inside 
the White House for a briefing by Reagan after 
his public announcement reported that his stance 
and rhetoric were “as tough as nails” on the right 
(or lack thereof) of a public employee union to 
strike against the public safety.77 Reagan later 
explained, “[y]ou cannot allow a strike to shut 
down a vital government service... I agreed with 
Calvin Coolidge, who said, ‘There is no right 
to strike against the public safety by anybody, 
anywhere, any time.’”78
Reagan and Coolidge also held the staunch 
belief that the refusal of these men and women 
to return to work necessitated their termina-
tion and ban from future service. Coolidge was 
counseled by Police Commissioner and former 
Boston Mayor Curtis, who convinced Coolidge 
that the striking officers should not be allowed 
to return to the force.79 Reagan was advised by 
Office of Personnel Management Director Don-
ald Devine and Senior Advisor Ed Meese, who 
counseled the President to ban the strikers from 
seeking employment within the FAA, but allow 
them to seek other federal employment.80 After 
conferring with Vice President Bush and a team 
of advisors from around the Administration, 
Reagan agreed to these terms of termination.81
Coolidge’s political success following the Bos-
ton Police Strike showed Reagan that a president 
could take drastic action, stand strong against a 
public sector union and benefit in the polls. After 
the Police Strike, Coolidge’s approval ratings 
skyrocketed and he was reelected Governor in 
November 1919, handily defeating Democrat 
Richard Long, whose platform included reinstat-
ing the police officers.82 Coolidge was selected 
as the Republican Vice Presidential nominee in 
1920, and elevated to the Presidency upon the 
death of Warren G. Harding in 1923.83 Harding 
ran on a platform of a “return to normalcy” after 
the tumult of the Great War years and the ensu-
ing Red Scare.84 For Harding, there was no man 
more appropriate for this return to normalcy 
than post-strike Coolidge.85 Coolidge was easily 
reelected President in 1924, stumping on the 
slogan “Keep Cool with Coolidge.” 
Similarly, some six decades later, the Reagan 
Administration was bolstered by the positive 
attention it received as a result of the PATCO 
strike. It is estimated that in the days and weeks 
following the ultimatum and the start of the 
strike, communications traffic into the White 
House from the American people was over-
whelmingly favorable, by a margin of 13-1.86 
Three years later, President Reagan was easily 
reelected. His cheery “Morning in America” 
campaign portrayed the country on the upswing 
and on its way back to social normalcy and free 
market economic prosperity, ideas reinforced 
by Reagan’s success in handling the PATCO 
strike.87 On Election Night 1984, Reagan won 
every state in the union with the exception of 
Walter Mondale’s home state of Minnesota.88 In 
exit polls, the economy (including labor/union 
issues) was a close second place on the minds of 
most Americans, narrowly behind the threat of 
nuclear war with the Soviets.89 Reagan even col-
lected 46% of the union vote.90 Today, President 
Reagan and his legacy are fondly remembered 
by many as he places third in CNN’s recent 
“Most Popular Past U.S. Presidents” poll.91 
III . Reagan and the New Generation 
After the Reagan Administration’s success in 
breaking the PATCO union, labor leaders and 
political commentators feared the shockwave 
that would resonate from the event. They wor-
ried that Reagan’s example would “strengthen 
the hand of local governments everywhere.”92 
These union sympathizers foresaw “thousands 
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of little Ronald Reagans across the country” 
standing up to public unions as the President had 
done.93 Indeed, most of the next generation of 
Republican leaders, those in power today, have 
largely followed Reagan’s example.
As with the periods leading up to the 1919 
Police Strike and the 1981 PATCO Strike, there 
are clear similarities between the period leading 
up to the PATCO Strike and the period leading 
up to the decisive Republican victories in the 
2009/2010 midterm election, which undoubt-
edly boosted conservative Republican efforts to 
turn back the tide of public labor. During both 
periods, the Democrats had a stranglehold of 
power in Washington. In 1981, Democrats had 
a 243 to 192-seat advantage in the House of 
Representatives, with a boisterous and active 
Speaker of the House in Tip O’Neil.94 In 2009, 
Democrats held a staggering 59 to 41 advantage 
in the Senate, and a 235 to 198 advantage in a 
House of Representatives, led by outspoken San 
Francisco Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi.95
The economic and sociopolitical climates 
were also similar during these two time peri-
ods. In 1981, the unemployment rate hit 7.6%.96 
In 2010, that rate was 9.6%.97 As the nation 
saw under Jimmy Carter with his expansion 
of the minimum wage and other entitlement 
programs,98 Barack Obama has done the same 
with his Affordable Care Act and his call to 
raise the minimum wage in his 2013 State of 
the Union Address.99  Although the breaking 
of the PATCO Strike set public sector unions 
back, “[t]hey survived the post-PATCO strike 
era and remained the most vibrant part of the 
labor movement [into this century].”100 As in 
1981, the dire financial predicament the states 
and federal government found themselves in 
in 2010 (and still today) required robust action 
from the government to reign in spending and 
balance state and federal budgets.101
With this climate as the backdrop, two men 
have risen to prominence in the Conservative 
movement: Scott Walker and Chris Christie. 
Like Coolidge and Reagan before them, these 
men have confronted public labor unions with 
much success. Ronald Reagan saw the perils 
of ever-expanding public sector collective bar-
gaining in an economy where most Americans, 
especially in the private sector, were taking cuts 
in pay and benefits. In fact, it was PATCO’s 
rejection of Reagan’s offer—an offer almost uni-
versally believed to be both fiscally responsible 
and fair to the taxpayer, the government, and 
PATCO—that convinced the President to take 
the bold action of breaking the strike and firing 
the workers.102 Following in his footsteps thirty 
years later, Walker and Christie confronted pub-
lic sector unions using the memory of Reagan 
as their guide.
a. Reagan and Governor Scott Walker (R-WI) 
Scott Walker was sworn in as Governor of Wis-
consin on January 3, 2011, swept in with the 
Republican electoral wave of 2010. Running on 
a platform of fiscal responsibility in Madison, 
Governor Walker immediately got to work fixing 
the state budget. Upon his inauguration, Walker 
faced a $3 billion deficit left by his Democratic 
predecessor Jim Doyle.103 One of his major tar-
gets in combatting the budget shortfall was pub-
lic sector unions and their government contracts. 
Governor Walker, and those who subscribe to his 
philosophy, believed that in order to close the 
budget gap, legislators must take efforts to rein 
in substantial public employee pay and benefits.
Walker is undoubtedly a devotee of Ronald 
Reagan and his philosophy. Like Reagan with 
Coolidge, Walker used Reagan as his guiding 
light. The night before he submitted his Budget 
Repair Bill to the Assembly, Walker gathered his 
staff in his office as “a last hurrah before [they] 
dropped the bomb [(the Budget Repair Bill)].”104 
Governor Walker proceeded to take a picture 
of Reagan from his pocket, and instructed his 
team to prepare for war,105 stating: “thirty years 
ago Ronald Reagan . . . had one of the most 
defining moments of his political career, not just 
of his presidency, when he fired the air traffic 
controllers… This is our moment, this is our time 
to change history.”106 Walker proclaimed that it 
was his chance to follow Reagan’s example; no 
matter the personal cost.107
The next day, Walker signed Act 10, the 2011 
Budget Repair Bill (“Act 10” or “the Act”), a bill 
that was the culmination of his labor relations 
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efforts. The Act limits collective bargaining for 
most state employees (excluding police officers 
and fire fighters) to negotiations over wages.108 
Further, “wage increases are capped on the cost 
of living unless higher wages are approved in a 
referendum.”109 It also limits contracts for state 
employees to one year110 and precludes state 
employers from collecting union dues.111 The 
Act outlaws “fair share clauses” for all unions 
except fire and police unions,112 allowing govern-
ment employees to remain in a union without 
paying union dues. Finally, each year, unions 
must hold recertification elections to determine 
if they have the support of a majority of their 
constituents.113 After a 61-hour debate on the 
floor of the Wisconsin Assembly, the bill passed 
51-17, with 25 Democrats, two Republicans and 
an independent not voting at all.114 In 2013, the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld Act 10 
in its entirety, putting to bed a long legal battle 
over the Act.115
Like Reagan drew harsh public criticism of his 
actions during the PATCO affair, Walker drew 
immediate fire for Act 10. In 1981, the PATCO 
criticism culminated in the massive Solidarity 
Day march of September 19, 1981, where over 
260,000 union supporters marched on Washing-
ton to protest the Reagan Administration’s labor 
policies.116 Similarly, in February of 2011, nearly 
70,000 people, including teachers who phoned-
in “sick” to their jobs, marched on Madison and 
occupied the statehouse to protest Governor 
Walker’s Act 10.117 Additionally, both men were 
subject to friendly fire from within their own 
party. Republican Congressman and future Vice 
Presidential nominee Jack Kemp told the media 
in 1981: “[t]he President has made his point… 
[N]ow for the safety of  travelers we must get [the 
controllers] back to work.”118 Walker squared off 
against three primary opponents in his recall 
election.119 Faced with this opposition, both men 
refused to back down from their positions and 
forged ahead with their original plans.
Like Reagan, Walker’s tough stance against 
public sector unions has been met with success. 
By the end of 2011, after the Budget Repair Bill 
was in effect, Wisconsin went from a $3 billion 
budget shortfall to a $300 million budget surplus 
projected by the end of the FY2012-2013 bienni-
um, an incredible feat.120 As a result, Wisconsin’s 
school districts (many of which employ teachers 
who occupied the Capitol Building in Madison) 
saw fiscal stabilization.121 For example, “[i]n New 
Berlin, the school district went from a $3 mil-
lion deficit to balancing its budget, and actually 
lowered school property tax by one percent . . . 
In Kaukauna . . . Act 10 has allowed the district’s 
projected operating budget to improve from a 
$400,000 deficit to approximately $1,500,000 
in the black.”122
Surprisingly, both men saw political support 
from unions despite their union busting. Rea-
gan, who was perceived by many union and 
nonunion households as being fair while stand-
ing tough against labor scofflaws in order to fix 
the national economy, received a large share of 
the union vote in 1984 and was invited to (and 
warmly accepted at) the national convention of 
the United Brotherhood of Carpenters only one 
month after issuing his PATCO ultimatum.123 In 
March 2013, Walker faced stiff opposition to two 
controversial bills: one that prohibits local units 
of government from enforcing residency require-
ments on public employees, and a mining bill.124 
The residency bill faced strong opposition from 
local governments who felt public employees 
must live and pay taxes in the communities in 
order to work there.125 The mining bill faced op-
position from environmentalists.126 In his efforts 
to enact this legislation, Walker has received 
public support from several unions, including the 
Milwaukee Police Association and the Wisconsin 
Pipe Trades Union.127
Both Reagan and Walker had great electoral 
success following their anti-union policies. Rea-
gan cruised to victory in the 1984 presidential 
election, and Walker, who faced a Gubernatorial 
recall election in 2012, won by a comfortable 
margin, besting his original election perfor-
mance in 2010.128
b. Reagan and Governor Chris Christie 
(R-NJ)
Chris Christie defeated incumbent Democrat 
Jon Corzine to become Governor of New Jer-
sey in 2009. Christie has often cited President 
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Reagan for political inspiration throughout his 
career. Those who follow Christie’s work in 
the statehouse claim that he channels Ronald 
Reagan on a daily basis in his style and rhetoric. 
Like Reagan, Christie “has an uncanny ear for 
what troubles Americans.”129 In fact, Christie 
has looked to Reagan’s handling of the PATCO 
strike as inspiration for his own tussles with or-
ganized labor in New Jersey. Speaking before a 
banquet at the Reagan Presidential Library in 
2011, Christie said:
Everybody in this room . . . has his or her 
favorite Reagan story. For me, that story 
happened thirty years ago, in August 1981. 
The air traffic controllers, in violation of 
their contracts, went on strike. President 
Reagan ordered them back to work, mak-
ing clear that those who refused would be 
fired. In the end, thousands refused, and 
thousands were fired.130
Christie has followed through with this example. 
In one of his first major addresses to the citi-
zens of New Jersey, Governor Christie laid out 
the state’s dire financial situation. Like Walker 
in Wisconsin, Christie inherited “a budget deficit 
of $2.2 billion, which was projected to expand 
to $10.7 billion [in 2011] . . .”131 Like Reagan, 
Christie quashed the notion of tax increases to 
close the deficit and, instead, took on the state’s 
spending expenditures against the wishes of the 
majority of Democrats, and even some Repub-
licans, in the state legislature.132
Christie set out an ambitious plan to curb state 
spending. His plan combined “reducing aid to 
schools and municipalities by $820 million and 
$466 million respectively, and forgoing a $3 
billion contribution to state pensions.”133 In a 
time where both public and private employees 
were taking salary, pension, and benefit cuts, 
Christie asked the teachers’ union to contrib-
ute 1.5% of their pay to help fund their health 
insurance, when most had never been required 
to make any contributions before.134 Christie’s 
request was reasonable and well below what 
most workers were required to contribute in 
other jobs. According to the Kaiser Founda-
tion, in 2011, premiums for worker-only health 
coverage averaged $5,429 annually.135 Typically, 
workers paid $921 or 5.9% of their premiums.136 
Christie’s pension reform plan also raised the 
retirement age for public workers hired since 
July 2011 to 65, “making all public workers pay 
a larger contribution toward their retirement 
benefits, and suspending the promise to give 
retirees automatic cost-of-living adjustments.”137
Finally, Christie sought to reform the way in 
which teachers are paid and evaluated. Christie’s 
reforms changed the pay scale and tenure rules 
from being based on seniority/degrees earned 
to being determined by classroom performance, 
making it harder for public school teachers to 
earn tenure, and easier for schools to terminate 
under-performing teachers.138 The new law man-
dates that teachers work for four years, one of 
which must be under a mentor, and earn satisfac-
tory ratings in at least two years.139 “Teachers who 
fail to earn high ratings for two consecutive years 
will automatically face revocation of tenure, un-
less they have shown some improvement.”140 
Christie’s bills passed the Democrat-controlled 
legislature in August 2012.
As with Reagan, Christie faces stern opposi-
tion from labor leaders. Christie, who is up for 
reelection in November of 2013, is frequently 
greeted by large groups of protestors at many 
campaign stops, challenging him on his budget 
cuts.141 After Reagan issued his 48-hour ulti-
matum to PATCO, union clusters gathering to 
weather the strike could be heard chanting “Fuck 
the President” and “Take this job and shove it.”142 
Similarly, on a recent occasion while Governor 
Christie was walking on the Seaside Heights 
Boardwalk with his family, a group of detractors 
confronted him with a profanity-laced tirade, at-
tacking his anti-union policies. In true character, 
Christie stood firm, responding “[y]ou’re a real 
big shot. Keep walking away. Big shot.”143
Tactically, both the teachers’ union and 
PATCO attempted to apply public and political 
pressure on these men in an attempt to get them 
to capitulate to their demands. Reagan respond-
ed to the union’s demands with steadfastness. 
After Reagan’s ultimatum was issued, PATCO 
co-founder Jack Maher turned to co-founder 
185
LABOR LAW JOURNAL
Mike Rock and tried to convince him that they 
would win the war if they could just hold out a 
bit longer.144 Rock replied “[y]ou can back down 
the secretary of transportation, the FAA, or an in-
dividual congressman or senator . . . But [when] 
you put the president of the United States pub-
licly in a corner, he can’t back down.”145 In New 
Jersey, after Christie asked the teacher’s union to 
contribute to their insurance plan, most teachers 
refused.146 Christie went straight to the people 
and asked voters to vote down any school board 
budget that did not comply with his request.147 
An impressive 58% of proposed school budgets 
were defeated after Christie’s plea.148 “Just as 
Reagan did in 1981 when he faced off with the 
air traffic controllers union, Christie called the 
bluff and seems to have won.”149
Finally, like Reagan, Christie has flourished 
since his run-in with New Jersey public unions. 
When Reagan resisted PATCO and terminated 
its striking workers, his showing of strength gave 
him “a huge infusion of presidential credibility, 
even among some people who deplored the act 
itself.”150 Many believe that it was this moment 
that defined his presidency. Similarly, Christie’s 
principles have earned him supporters in some 
unlikely places. In February 2013, well-known 
liberal billionaire and Facebook founder Mark 
Zuckerberg hosted a lavish fundraiser for Chris-
tie at his Palo Alto home.151 A spokesperson for 
Zuckerberg and his wife proclaimed, “[Mr. and 
Mrs. Zuckerberg] admired the governor’s work 
on education policy.”152 In November 2013, 
Christie will face Democratic State Senator 
Barbara Buono in the New Jersey gubernatorial 
election. Currently, he has an overwhelming 
39.3 percentage-point advantage over Buono.153 
An astounding 71% of the State of New Jersey, 
a solid “Blue State,” at least in federal elections, 
believes the Republican Governor deserves a 
second term in office.154
IV . Today’s Political Climate and the 
Future of Public Sector Unions
After President Reagan turned back PATCO, 
columnist George Will celebrated the conser-
vative victory as the end of “liberal permis-
siveness and a runaway rights revolution . . . 
[saying] ‘[i]n a sense, the ‘60s ended in August 
1981.’”155 This declaration was exaggerated, as 
Reagan’s run-in with PATCO did not usher in 
a long-lasting conservative utopia. In the same 
vein, after Scott Walker successfully fended off 
a recall effort, New York Post columnist Rich 
Lowry wrote, “[t]he [political] left’s year-and-
a-half-long siege of Wisconsin has receded in 
failure like the Muslim invaders at the gates of 
Vienna in 1529. The Ottomans were never quite 
the same, and the public-sector unions won’t be 
either . . . Yesterday’s vote may be remembered 
as the death rattle of public-sector unions in the 
state that first created them.”156
Indeed, public sector union membership has 
declined in recent years. For instance, the Wis-
consin American Federation of State, County, 
and Municipal Employees (“AFSCME”) “shrunk 
from 62,818, when Walker undertook his re-
forms[,] to 28,745 [and] [t]he American Federa-
tion of Teachers-Wisconsin lost 6,000 members 
out of 17,000.”157 Moreover, public animosity 
toward unions is on the upswing. In 2009, be-
fore this latest period of anti-union action, only 
48% of Americans polled said they supported 
labor unions.158 As of 2010, a Pew Research 
Poll reported that only 41% of Americans had a 
favorable opinion of labor unions.159 For many 
taxpaying citizens, deciding between honoring 
comparatively cushy union contracts and hav-
ing the ability to provide for necessary public 
services is an easy choice.
Contrary to popular belief, it’s not just Repub-
licans in “Red States” that are rolling back union 
rights and privileges. In the summer of 2012, 
California cities like San Jose and San Diego 
overwhelmingly approved ballot measures that 
scaled down union pensions.160 Even Democratic 
Governor Andrew Cuomo of New York has 
adopted the cause of pension reform to save his 
financially ailing state in these lean economic 
times.161 As Cuomo has reasoned, unions must 
accept these changes now or face layoffs later.162
It can be argued that the labor policies imple-
mented by Governors Christie and Walker are 
not destroying unions; they are saving unions 
from themselves. Public unions will not survive 
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in this period of budgetary austerity unless they 
agree to adapt. Evolving will require consent-
ing to reforms like those in New Jersey, where 
Christie has required teachers to pay money 
into their insurance and pension systems (as 
most American workers do) and accept merit-
based standards for evaluation and pay. If they 
don’t, the perception of unions as inefficient, 
greedy, bureaucratic institutions will continue 
to grow, negatively affecting public perception 
even in traditionally pro-union states such as 
Wisconsin and California. Whether this percep-
tion is right or wrong, this is largely the public 
opinion across the nation. In all corners of the 
country, the policies of Christie and Walker are 
being adopted in large numbers, by Governors 
Daniels (Former Gov. R-IN), Haley (R-SC), 
Snyder (R-MI), Perry (R-TX), Scott (R-FL), Ka-
sich (R-OH), Otter (R-ID), Cuomo (D-NY), and 
many, many other legislators, congressmen, 
senators and governors across the nation.163 It 
appears that the prophecy that many labor lead-
ers feared in the 1980s, that “thousands of little 
Ronald Reagans” would permeate throughout 
the country, may be coming true.164 If unions 
don’t accept the changes in our economy and 
society and continue to refuse to work with 
legislators and executives to reform labor-
management relations in the public sector, they 
are doomed to extinction. Detractors might 
point out that voters in places like Idaho and 
Ohio have rejected certain public sector union 
reforms on referendum; nonetheless, even with 
these sporadic defeats, legislators and state 
executives across the nation have continued 
to push ahead with their restructurings and, on 
the whole, the public has been largely accepting 
and supportive of these reforms.165
While labor unions certainly need to change 
their approach to dealing with their government 
employers, proponents of public sector labor 
unions argue that government employers can 
also adapt to make public sector unions more 
sustainable, while simultaneously allowing the 
government entity to improve itself. In doing so, 
these unions may be able to aid the government 
in slimming budgets and bringing prosperity to 
the nation.
For example, according to Chicago-Kent 
School of Law Professor Martin Malin, “[s]tud-
ies in the private sector show that when unions 
are strong and have a cooperative relationship 
with management, they provide independent 
employee voice that plays a crucial role in 
the successful development and sustenance of 
high performance workplace practices.”166 As 
Malin posits, unilateral employer action results 
in an almost reflexive negative and rebellious 
reaction from the union.167 Conversely, when 
unions are engaged and allowed to provide 
input to a plan along with management, they 
can serve as a “contributor” to effective gov-
ernment rather than an impediment.168 Labor 
experts Saul Rubinstein and John McCarthy 
document excellent examples of this phenom-
enon in a 2010 study.169 Their paper focuses on 
labor-management teambuilding among teach-
ers’ unions, school administrators, and school 
boards.170 As a result of these collaborative 
partnerships, the public schools studied have 
shown measured improvement in “develop-
ment, scheduling, budgeting, strategic planning, 
hiring, subject articulation, interdisciplinary in-
tegration, mentoring, professional development 
and evaluation.”171 Adopting such a cooperative 
course might prove beneficial in the long-term 
for both the stabilization of government budgets 
and the popularity and sustainability of public 
sector unions. 
V . Conclusion
In studying the past, we often see a single thread 
that binds epochs in history together. America 
has witnessed remarkably similar phases of anti-
union government action and public opinion 
before in 1919 and 1981, and we are seeing it 
again now. As this paper has demonstrated, the 
actors in each period have taken from the last in 
terms of tactics, rhetoric, and technique and all 
have experienced similar outcomes. Reagan, as 
a student of Coolidge, and Walker and Christie, 
as students of Reagan, have followed the success-
ful battle plans of those who have come before 
them. As a result, these leaders have been able 
to calm the growing public union tide and right 
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their state’s budgetary ships, while also bringing 
the general public onto their side, even in tra-
ditionally pro-union states like New Jersey and 
Wisconsin. As the dominoes continue to fall for 
public unions in traditionally friendly territory 
like Michigan, New York, and California, today’s 
public unions would be wise to study the failures 
of the Boston Police and PATCO and commit to 
cooperation and innovation with their govern-
ment employers. Although unions bounced back 
from the brink after those failures, our nation’s 
current extreme economic, social, and political 
conditions might sound the final death knell for 
public sector unions. n
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